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This project investigates the relationship between the geographical dispersion and speed 
of a disaster and how they increase the complexity of relief operations. Using the 
Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) available from the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), information was collected and filtered for 281 U.S. 
disasters that occurred between 2000 and 2011. Data was utilized from the U.S. Census 
Bureau to supplement the EM-DAT information to determine the area affected for each 
disaster. Each disaster was then ranked and assigned a value to represent the speed of 
onset based on each type and subtype that was provided by EM-DAT. Plotting the 
disasters yielded a graph that was further analyzed to determine whether any patterns 
existed by comparing the number of personnel affected, number of casualties, and total 
damage costs incurred. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether the complexity 
of a disaster can be determined from its dispersion and speed of onset. 
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Planning for humanitarian assistance is extremely challenging because of the 
uncertainty in predicting when a disaster is going to occur, where it is going to happen, 
and how catastrophic it will be. Knowing the exact disaster scenario would be ideal but is 
simply not realistic. A significant percentage of the world’s population has suffered as the 
result of both human (man-made) and natural disasters in recent years. The goal of this 
report is to determine whether personnel affected, number of casualties, and total damage 
costs are related to the operational complexity of the humanitarian response, based on the 
geographical dispersion and the speed of onset of natural disasters. 
The trend of reported natural disasters for the past 35 years has been steadily 
increasing, as seen in Figure 1 (Emergency Events Database [EM-DAT], 2013). One of 
the causes of this increased trend is an increasing world population, especially toward 
more coastal regions, and an increase in reporting smaller disasters. As populations grow, 
so do the number of reported natural disasters. The unique challenges posed by natural 
disasters, combined with their increased frequency, underscore the importance of 
conducting research in this area. 
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Figure 1.  Natural Disasters 1975–2011 (from EM-DAT, 2013) 
B. RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND QUESTIONS 
One would suspect that increases in geographical dispersion and speed of a 
disaster would drive an increase in the complexity of relief operations. The goal of this 
study is to analyze historical disaster information to ascertain the validity of this 
suspected relationship. 
Determining whether the operational complexity of humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations relates to the dispersion of geographical area 
affected and the speed of onset of natural disasters can provide valuable information to 
planners of all agencies. Although positive results from this project may be useful in 
planning and conducting HADR, this project has limitations in its scope. 
The main limitation of the project is the fidelity of the forecast of when or where a 
disaster will occur or how catastrophic it will be. This limitation applies not only to this 
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project, but also to almost any planning efforts conducted for HADR. Without the ability 
to forecast where or when a disaster may occur, it is difficult to predict the assets and 
supplies that may be needed during recovery efforts. 
The lack of information on when and where a disaster may strike adds levels of 
difficulty to budget and resource planning, which affects the many agencies involved in 
HADR. To appropriately determine the level of difficulty within the classifications 
outlined in Figure 2, we first have to establish parameters by defining the location: 
localized or dispersed (Apte, 2009). 
 
Figure 2.  Disaster Classification and Difficulty of Response (after Apte, 2009) 
The conclusion we derived from our project is intended to provide analysis 
parameters to assist response planners and financial providers in better determining the 
complexity associated with disasters given its speed of onset and dispersion. 
 4 
C. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY 
Using the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) available from the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), we collected and filtered the 
following information on 281 U.S. disasters that occurred between 2000 and 2011: 
• year, 
• sequence number, 
• disaster subgroup, 
• disaster type, 
• disaster subtype, 
• example, 
• entry criteria, 
• region, 
• location, 
• disaster duration, 
• number killed, 
• number affected, and 
• total damage. 
We utilized data from the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.) to supplement the EM-DAT 
information to determine the area affected for each disaster. We then ranked each disaster 
and assigned a value to represent the speed of onset based on each type and subtype. 
Plotting the disasters yielded a graph that was further analyzed to determine whether any 
patterns existed by comparing the number of personnel affected, personnel killed 
(referred throughout the rest of this report as number of casualties), and total damage 
costs. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether the complexity of a disaster can 
be determined from its dispersion and speed of onset. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
This report is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, we discuss the 
background, present our research motivation and research questions, summarize the 
methodology used, and provide a layout for this report. In Chapter II, we review literature 
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on HADR topics and how they relate to this project. In Chapter III, we identify the source 
of our data and the methodology used. In Chapter IV, we provide the analysis of data 
collected, the findings of hypothetical testing, and a discussion of the results. Finally, in 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER 
RELIEF  
1. Disasters 
The term disaster has different meanings to different organizations and people. 
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requires the president’s 
authority to determine the need for federal supplemental aid and uses a statutory 
definition from the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Robert T. Stafford 
Act, 2013), provided by U.S. Congress, to define a major disaster as follows: 
Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high 
water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of 
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, 
which, in the determination of the President, causes damage of sufficient 
severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the 
Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, 
local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the 
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. (p. 59)  
Federal disaster law restricts the use of arithmetical formulas or other objective 
standards as the sole basis for determining whether to provide federal supplemental aid in 
response to a disaster event. As a result, FEMA assesses a multitude of factors when 
determining the severity, magnitude, and impact of a disaster event (FEMA, 2013). The 
following are some of the primary factors that FEMA (2013) uses to assess disaster 
events: 
• amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed or with major 
damage); 
• impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or critical facilities; 
• imminent threats to public health and safety; 
• impacts to essential government services and functions; 
• unique capability of federal government; 
• dispersion or concentration of damage; 
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• level of insurance coverage in place for homeowners and public facilities; 
• available assistance from other sources (federal, state, local, voluntary 
organizations); 
• state and local resource commitments from previous, undeclared events; 
and 
• frequency of disaster events over recent time period. 
Since 1988, the CRED has been maintaining the EM-DAT. The CRED’s website 
states that “the main objective of the database is to serve the interest of the humanitarian 
action at national and international levels” (EM-DAT, 2013). Just like FEMA, the CRED 
requires that disasters meet certain criteria in order for them to be recorded within its 
database: 
• 10 or more people reported killed; 
• 100 or more people reported affected; 
• declaration of a state of emergency; and 
• call for international assistance. (EM-DAT, 2013) 
2. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
The terms humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR) both include 
operations designed to relieve suffering due to the occurrence of a disaster and to aid in 
recovery (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). There is a difference between the two terms, 
however. Various academic literature suggests that DR is defined by its immediacy, 
whereas HA is the provision of more long-term support to help alleviate suffering and aid 
in recovery (Apte, 2009; Kovács & Spens, 2007; Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009b). 
The Department of Defense (DoD) also defines HA and DR in Joint Publication 
1-02 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
Humanitarian Assistance—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the 
results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such 
as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious 
threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. 
Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and 




complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that 
may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian 
assistance. (Gortney, 2010, p. 127) 
Foreign Disaster Relief—Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the 
suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian 
services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, 
beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of 
medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs 
to essential services. (Gortney, 2010, p. 127) 
3. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Life Cycle 
Kovács and Spens (2007) identified the three phases of disaster management by 
stating, “Different operations can be distinguished in the times before a disaster strikes 
(the preparation phase), instantly after a disaster (the immediate response phase) and in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster (the reconstruction phase),” as illustrated in Figure 3 
(Kovács & Spens, 2007). Each of these phases of the HADR life cycle requires different 
resources and expertise because of the different requirements. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Phases of Disaster Relief Operations (from Kovács & Spens, 2007) 
Tatham and Houghton (2011) illustrated the disaster management cycle shown in 
Figure 4. Rather than describe the HADR phases as preparation, immediate response, and 
reconstruction, Tatham and Houghton (2011) described the phases as prevention, 
transition, and recovery. Figure 4 shows the different events that occur within each phase 
of the HADR cycle in more detail. 
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Figure 4.  The Disaster Management Cycle (from Tatham & Houghton, 2011) 
Transportation planning is a very important part of the immediate response phase 
to a disaster because, since the 1990s, it has grown to be the second largest operating cost 
in HADR, behind disaster relief personnel (Pedraza Martinez, Stapleton, & Van 
Wassenhove, 2011). 
4. Disaster Classification 
Although FEMA’s definition of a disaster defines the outcome, it does not define 
the nature of the event. Van Wassenhove (2006) further classified disasters according to 
their speed (slow versus sudden onset) and their source (natural versus man-made). His 
classification structure is useful because it describes some of the challenges that occur 




Figure 5.  Explaining Disasters (from Van Wassenhove, 2006) 
Ergun, Karakus, Keskinocak, Swann, and Villareal (2010) also grouped disasters 
into these two categories (natural and man-made), but they also discussed that disasters 
could further be “categorized by predictable timing (or seasonal) such as floods or 
unpredictable timing like earthquakes and predictable location such as hurricanes or 
unpredictable locations like tsunamis” (Ergun et al., 2010). 
Apte (2009) classified disasters into four groups, as seen in Figure 2: slow-
onset/localized, slow-onset/dispersed, sudden-onset/localized, and sudden-
onset/dispersed. Disasters that occur over time and are slow-onset allow responders to 
plan and prepare relief efforts. Disasters that strike suddenly pose a more significant 
challenge for responders because these types of events are difficult to plan for in advance. 
The level of difficulty of response or relief is also different for disasters that affect 
localized areas as opposed to large and populated geographical areas. Localized, slow-
onset disasters are on one end of the spectrum on the level of difficulty, while dispersed, 
sudden-onset disasters are on the other end of the spectrum (Apte, 2009). 
The causes of disasters are not always clear-cut, so just the process of classifying 
the disasters can be a challenge (Kovács & Spens, 2009). Floods, for example, can be 
considered natural due to a heavier-than-normal rainy season, man-made as a result of 
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dams being constructed on earthquake-prone tectonic fault lines, or primarily natural, but 
with a man-made component, because deforestation resulted in the flooding disaster. 
Many disasters defy a clear-cut categorization. This issue is one of the challenges in 
humanitarian logistics, as man-made causes of disasters can be counteracted, thus altering 
the focus of relief programs (Kovács & Spens, 2009). 
To understand the relationship between disaster classification and operational 
complexity, we began by looking at several projects undertaken by other researchers in 
which classification was utilized based on the quadrants of Apte (2009), shown in Figure 
2. A common theme that we identified among these classifications is the need for further 
research regarding the parameters that define localized versus dispersed, and slow onset 
versus sudden. 
Yoho and Apte (2011) found that while disasters were classified into the four 
quadrants, the terms slow-onset, sudden-onset, localized, and dispersed were relative. 
Determining the accuracy of the localized or dispersed categorization of disasters is 
important; however, the way a disaster is categorized might vary depending on the lens 
through which a person views the disaster. From a global perspective, a disaster that 
occurs in a single country could be considered a localized incident. At the same time, a 
disaster in a single region within a larger country—such as a state within the United 
States—could also be viewed as a localized incident. By acknowledging the perspective 
from which one looks, the relative impact of a disaster changes. It is natural to infer that a 
dispersed disaster is one that impacts multiple countries in the world or multiple states 
within a single country. Many previous studies have used a worldwide view to classify 
the Indonesian tsunami of 2004, the Haiti earthquake of 2010, and the Tohoku earthquake 
and tsunami of 2011. 
We found that the labels localized and dispersed varied depending on the lens 
through which the disaster was viewed. Viewing from a countries perspective, we could 
consider a disaster dispersed due to the affected land area and personnel; but viewed from 
a global perspective, we could consider the disaster localized.  For example, Ures (2011) 
classified the Haiti earthquake in 2010, claiming 230,000 lives and displacing two million 
people, as localized and sudden-onset. For comparison purposes, Ures (2011) classified 
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the Indonesian tsunami of 2004 as dispersed and sudden-onset due to its impact spanning 
14 countries, even though it claimed just over 227,000 lives and displaced 1.1 million 
people. Additionally, Yoho and Apte (2011) chose to classify the Haiti earthquake in the 
same manner as Ures (2011) did and explained their reasoning by choosing to define 
localized and dispersed based on the number of civil administrative districts impacted. 
They elaborated on this definition by explaining that districts can be defined by cities, 
countries, townships, parishes, provinces, or states. Although geographic impact is one 
way to differentiate between localized and dispersed, there are many other factors to 
consider, and this shifting classification provides the need for further research. 
Geographic distances do increase the logistical problems, but it is still unclear as to 
whether an increase in population density over a smaller landscape requires an increase in 
the volume of resources (e.g., recovery personnel and equipment) equal to that of a 
dispersed-impact disaster with low density. 
B. COMPLEXITIES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER 
RELIEF LOGISTICS 
Although researchers have not settled on a single definition for humanitarian 
logistics, Thomas and Mizushima (2005) agreed, after much deliberation, on the 
preliminary definition as “the process of planning, implementing and controlling the 
efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as related 
information, from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of meeting the 
end beneficiary’s requirement” (p. 60). There are complexity barriers in every facet of 
humanitarian logistics that impact relief operations. These complexities fall into three 
general groups: governance, leadership, and logistics. 
1. Governance 
The construct of the host nation’s governing body, cultural ideologies, judicial 
laws, economic stability, and infrastructure can create significant barriers to the efficient 
execution of relief efforts. Each of these evaluators can either enhance or degrade an 
area’s ability to withstand a natural disaster. 
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The bureaucratic structure of U.S. emergency management operations is a good 
place to analyze the impact of laws on relief operations. Takeda and Helms (2006) 
studied the events surrounding the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
described FEMA’s role as “the governmental body dedicated to protecting and aiding 
Americans in the case of natural and man-made disasters” (p. 398). They also noted that 
after the events on 9/11, the United States transferred the majority of FEMA’s resources 
to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate under the supervision of the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security. 
Relief funds scrutinized by multiple levels of the government to ensure fair 
distribution, delay swift responses in the aftermath of a disaster. Takeda and Helms 
(2006) described bureaucratic management systems as complicated, consisting of 
numerous experts working in very specific fields, requiring many meetings and sharing 
of information, to facilitate the centralized decision making. They found that the 
bureaucratic model has one universal problem that is detrimental to the success of relief 
operations. Decentralized knowledge with centralized decision making “are barriers to 
swift analysis and implementation of ‘outside’ information and resources, making it 
difficult to respond quickly and efficiently in the aftermath of hurricanes” (Takeda & 
Helms, 2006, p. 402). These roadblocks are a common theme among responses to all 
disasters and significantly increase the complexity of operations by preventing rapid 
relief efforts by responders. 
Governance issues come in many forms. Countries ranking high in governance 
tend to provide better infrastructure, especially in terms of disaster preparation. For 
example, a country investing resources to build improved seawalls and enforce stricter 
building codes helps to minimize damages resulting from an earthquake or tsunami. 
Although not all improvements will prevent severe damage, devastation can be much 
worse if a government does not prioritize the investment of federal funds in this 
preparation. Ergun et al. (2010) noted that the “Indian government did not invite 
international aid agencies to participate at all in the first 60 days of the relief effort” 
following the 2004 Indonesian tsunami. This type of governmental response contributes 
to the complexity of HADR, as well. Haiti had very little invested in preparing its 
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infrastructure to handle a disaster such as the earthquake in 2010 and the resulting 
damage, which included “28 of 29 government ministry buildings in the capital, killing 
17 percent of the country’s civil service and destroying decades of administrative records 
… and decimation of national government;” the nature of these impacts increased the 
complexity of operations immensely (Ures, 2011). 
2. Leadership 
Disaster relief operations are very similar to those found in combat situations in 
which a lack of leadership can make a mission misguided and ineffective. Mission focus 
and organization become more complex with each additional unit, task, or layer of 
decision makers and can lead to confusion when coordinating unified relief efforts. 
Deficiencies in the command and control (C2), specifically lines of communication, 
burden all facets of relief operations. Gabriel (2012) noted that communication issues 
proved to increase the complexity of operations in support of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Additionally, Gabriel (2012) 
discovered the “sharing of information is particularly critical following a disaster because 
no responding entity can be the source of all the necessary information” (p. 16). 
Following a disaster, a myriad of supporting cast members arrive on scene and 
fall into one of the many categories shown in Figure 6. Although the leadership and 
direction should start with the host nation, many times, the host nation itself is affected 
by the disaster or is not prepared to command such a large-scale operation. Tomasini and 
Van Wassenhove (2009a) highlighted this complexity as they described actors with little 
reason to work together prior to the disaster who are then faced with the challenge “to 
combine all their capacity and capability to relieve human suffering” (p. 549). Demand 
for leadership under these circumstances initially leads to the inefficient utilization of 
resources. When the United States is involved in operations, Herbert, Prosser, and 
Wharton (2012) noted a distinct flow of information in which the military typically takes 
over onsite unless the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a non-
governmental organization (NGO), is available and in position to do so. 
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Figure 6.  Typical Organizations Involved in HADR Missions (from Gabriel, 2012) 
Wishart (2008) interviewed 34 individuals within the military, NGOs, the United 
Nations, and the U.S. government to facilitate an understanding of how to build 
collaborative capacity in the initial stages of relief operations. He found significant 
barriers due to cultural differences among organizations, especially where the military 
was involved. The nature of military operations do not fully translate to the civilian sector 
and can intimidate or subdue immediate collaborative efforts between the involved 
entities. Wishart (2008) found that 91 percent of the respondents noted organizational 
distrust between groups, and 50 percent stated that this distrust was a barrier to 
collaborative effort, while 53 percent claimed cultural differences were a barrier to 
collaboration. In addition to C2 difficulties, the clashing of cultures and trust barriers 
among responders were contributors to the complexity of relief operations (Wishart, 
2008). 
3. Logistics 
Relief personnel are the central node to providing support after a natural disaster, 
and without them, host nations, states, or cities could not receive the necessary supplies 
to both survive the initial response and to begin reconstruction. Several works note that 
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the logistics of providing supplies to the affected area are both costly and difficult. 
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) stated, “international humanitarian supply chains are clearly 
unpredictable, turbulent, and requiring flexibility” (p. 117). These defining characteristics 
were supplemented by Ergun et al. (2010), who stated that the “demand structure of 
disasters is complicated and challenging because of the high unpredictability of its three 
main dimensions: time, location, and magnitude” (p. 5). Our review of multiple articles 
revealed a common theme among researchers attempting to discover solutions to the 
many challenges of humanitarian supply chains. In the literature we reviewed, the 
common method of analysis was to compare humanitarian supply chains to regular 
(commercial or for-profit) supply chains. 
The most common logistical challenges to humanitarian supply chains can be 
grouped in the following categories: complex environment, customer, unsolicited 
donations, speed, and professional expertise, which are presented in no particular order. 
a. Complex Environment 
The operating environment in a natural disaster poses a significant 
challenge to logisticians trying to get vital supplies to those that need them because of 
destabilized infrastructure, such as blocked roadways and downed communications. Less 
developed regions are also more prone to a larger scale destruction of their infrastructures 
due to poor housing situations and inadequate construction requirements (Kovács & 
Spens, 2007). The added pressures of a limited timeframe can mean the difference 
between life and death, a consequence that is oftentimes not dealt with in the private 
sector. 
b. Customer 
Defining the customer of a humanitarian supply chain is challenging. 
Although this is easily identifiable in a commercial supply chain, the person receiving the 
goods of a humanitarian supply chain has little to no impact on what is being delivered or 
the manner in which it is delivered. Oloruntuba and Gray (2006) stated that it is actually 
the donor who needs to be targeted to support the humanitarian actions. Identifying the 
customer allows organizations to focus efforts to correct the issue of customer 
 18 
responsiveness to supply chain efficiency. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) explained that the 
majority of donors preferred to donate tangible items or funds to purchase tangible items 
because donors were able to easily recognize the support these items would provide to 
disaster victims; however, this leaves little to no funds for the logistics side of the supply 
chain, such as forklifts. Ergun et al. (2010) and Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009b) 
echoed this concern while noting the difficulties of managing the quantity and mix of 
donations from participating donors who display varied levels of commitment to 
improving the relief efforts. 
c. Unsolicited Donations 
After a disaster, donations can come from many different sources and are 
often unsolicited. Logisticians will rarely have oversight on these donations, and this lack 
of visibility oftentimes creates unintended problems, especially when unnecessary 
supplies have to be managed. Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009b) discussed how 
unsolicited donations can add complexity to the operation, inefficiently taking up 
resources that could instead be used to provide better quality assistance. 
d. Speed 
Speed is a significant logistical challenge for humanitarian supply chains. 
Kovács and Spens (2007) pointed out that “the speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster 
depends on the ability of logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at the site 
of the humanitarian relief effort.” (p. 99) Commercial supply chains are typically 
evaluated using indicators like cost, speed, quality, and flexibility. Tomasini & Van 
Wassenhove (2009b) ascertain that while the focus of supply chains can differ among 
industries depending on their development, humanitarian supply chains must continually 
prioritize speed, due to the necessity of responding to acute emergencies. 
To increase the speed of responses to natural disasters, both Tomasini and 
Wassenhove (2009b) and Ergun et al. (2010) highlighted the need for an agile supply 
chain that requires the leaning out of processes that add little value. There is plenty of 
room for improvement, especially regarding the total lead time of moving supplies in the 
humanitarian sector. 
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e. Professional Expertise 
The lack of logistical experience among the major providers within the 
humanitarian supply chain is also a major complication. Both Oloruntoba and Gray 
(2006) and Ergun et al. (2010) described how the majority of personnel managing the 
supply chain for relief operations are not trained to do so and are rarely capable of 
resolving many of the issues that arise during the course of relief missions. Oloruntoba 
and Gray (2006) specifically noted in prior research that  
…a survey of 45 international aid organisations found that over 80 percent 
of all respondent organisations had a member of staff specialising in 
logistics and transportation duties, but only 45 percent had someone with a 
formal qualification in logistics, transport or related areas. (p. 118) 
Additional research conducted by Thomas and Mizushima (2005) 
analyzed a study conducted by the Fritz Institute detailing the lackluster performance in 
the logistics field surrounding humanitarian operations. They found that senior 
management spent all available resources procuring funds, investing in information and 
management systems, and emergency response planning, leaving the challenges of 
logistics and the training of logisticians absent in all planning stages of their response. 
This lack of attention leads to extreme inefficiencies and excessive spending to move 
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III. DATA/METHODOLOGY 
Data collection is the most important and difficult part of this project because it 
provides differentiators to assess the difficulty of providing relief. We collected statistical 
data for this research from the EM-DAT International Disaster Database. The database is 
maintained by CRED at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de 
Louvain located in Brussels, Belgium (EM-DAT, 2013). 
The archived data set contains statistical information for every disaster reported to 
CRED from the years 2000–2011. The data is organized with a numeric identifier based 
on the year in which the disaster occurred, and then by disaster subgroup/type/subtype, as 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   EM-DAT Disaster Categorization 
 
 
DISASTER SUBGROUP DISASTER TYPE DISASTER SUBTYPE













Mass movement wet Landslide
Mudslide




















The database contains multiple fields in which available information is recorded 
about each disaster. The first entry is the location, containing the country, continent, and 
any specific details, such as states, counties, or cities that were affected. The second entry 
contains the time period in which the disaster occurred, given in start month, day, and 
year, followed by ending month, day, and year. The remaining three entries are the 
number affected, number of casualties, and total damages (in thousands US$). 
A. DATA FILTERING 
We filtered the data to isolate only those disasters that occurred in the United 
States during the date range of the provided database (2000–2011). We applied this filter 
to control complexity factors involving economic and political instabilities that contribute 
more significantly in disasters that occur outside of the United States. Choosing a first-
world country ensures that a base level of preparation has been executed in the country, 
such as stricter building codes, better disaster preparedness, and a more capable 
emergency response force. Using only the United States in our sample also reduced 
additional opportunities for human error, as many of the locations that were entered 
contained spelling errors. In addition to the potential for inputting incorrect data, the time 
required to correct these types of spelling mistakes would have increased significantly if 
we had analyzed a country with which we lacked familiarity. 
B. DATA PREPROCESSING 
Upon filtering the database to the United States only, there were 281 disasters 
available for analysis. We used the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.) website to collect 2010 
census data for each location listed as an affected area for each disaster. Census data 
regarding population size, land area in square miles, population density (persons per 
square mile), and median household income were recorded. These categories were 
chosen to determine whether the complexity of operations could be linked to the number 
of people affected in the total population, the population density of the affected area, or 
the economic stability of the affected region represented by the median household 
income. 
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Once all the information was populated, it was determined that only 259 disasters 
contained adequate location data to be analyzed against the speed of onset ranking for 
those disasters. These 259 disasters with accompanying data became the sample for our 
research. Although total land area could be calculated for the sampled disasters, the 
vagueness of the affected areas prevented us from collecting complete population density 
and median household income information on all 259 disasters.  
C. TIME (X-AXIS VALUE) 
We developed a method to plot the selected disasters in the format shown in 
Figure 2. Once we collected parameters on all sample disasters, we quantified the speed 
of onset with a numerical value for each disaster subtype utilizing a ranking method. This 
was accomplished by ranking the subtypes listed in Table 1 in numerical order, with 1 
being the slowest onset and 27 being the most sudden. We conducted our rankings 
individually and then consolidated our answers into a final system after discussing our 
differences. The final speed of onset results are displayed in Table 2; we agreed that a 
drought would be given the value of 1 as the slowest onset disaster and an earthquake the 
value of 27 as the most sudden onset disaster. We chose to rank these disasters so that 
each type had its own discrete x value. This allowed for better data management when 











Table 2.   X-Axis (Speed of Onset) Ranking 
 
 
D. LOCATION (Y-AXIS VALUE) 
Location was determined to be the land area (square miles) that was recorded as 
the affected area of a disaster. We consolidated data collected from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (n.d.) for state, county, and city land area for all locations listed for each disaster. 
This provided a single numerical value to assist in categorizing a disaster as localized or 
dispersed, in accordance with Figure 2. For example, if a tornado was listed as affecting 
Texas and Oklahoma, then the affected area would be the sum of their respective land 
Disaster Type Rank Count
Drought 1 4
Epidemic 2 0
Viral Infectious Diseases 3 2
Cold Wave 4 2
Heat Wave 5 7
Extratropical Cyclone (Winter Storm) 6 1
Tropical Cyclone 7 25
Storm 8 24





Severe storm 14 4
Flood 15 4
General Flood 16 44
Freezing Rain 17 1
Hailstorm 18 3
Wildfire 19 2
Forest Fire 20 28
Bush/Brush Fire 21 1
Scrub/Grassland Fire 22 6
Flash Flood 23 5
Mudslide 24 1
Tornado 25 57
Volcanic Eruption 26 0
Earthquake (Seismic Activity) 27 4
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areas. This visual depiction provided us an initial opportunity to observe the interactions 
of location and time with respect to past disasters (see Figure 7). Disaster classifications 
broken into their respective quadrants are shown in Figure 8. 
 




Figure 8.  Disaster Classification by Quadrant 
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E. CLASSIFICATION 
Once we plotted the sample disasters, two possible outliers were observed: 257 of 
the 259 disasters each had an affected area of 1.7 million square miles or less. The 
remaining two disasters each contained an affected area of more than 61 million square 
miles. Calculating a z-score for these two disasters involved measuring them against the 
mean of the sample group and determining whether these were typical or atypical of our 
data set by showing how many standard deviations away these disasters were away from 
the sample mean.  
The Empirical Rule states that approximately 68.3 percent, 95.5 percent, and 99.7 
percent of values fall within 1, 2, and 3 standard deviations from the mean. Assuming 
that our population sample was normal, we identified any disaster with a z-score greater 
than 3 as an outlier. Using this method revealed z-score results of 11.55 and 11.52, 
respectively, for these two disasters. Although there were casualties in each disaster and 
only one included a list of damages, we decided that the affected locations provided were 
too vast to be calculated properly. The locations listed for these two outlying disasters 
were the Midwest, Southeast, Northeast, and Plains areas of the U.S. 
Removing the outliers provided clarity among the remaining data points. To 
categorize the remaining disasters into the appropriate quadrant, we calculated both the 
mean and median of the x and y values. The results are provided in Table 3. 









MEAN 15.95 232,063      
MEDIAN 16 111,950      
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The mean for our speed of onset ranking (x-values) in Table 3 was chosen to 
vertically separate disasters located in Quadrants I and II from Quadrants III and IV, as 
depicted in Figure 2. Using the mean also ensured that no disaster would fall on the 
divider between the quadrants. The median for dispersion (y-values) was chosen to 
horizontally separate Quadrants II and IV from Quadrants I and III. The median for 
dispersion was chosen because the mean yielded an uneven distribution of the disasters. 
This also provided a proportional split of the disasters between the localized and 
dispersed categories, again ensuring that no disaster would lie on the separating value. 
This categorization resulted in 37 disasters placed in Quadrant I, 70 in Quadrant II, 97 in 
Quadrant III, and 64 in Quadrant IV. 
Further analysis injected the third dimension of number affected, number of 
casualties, and total damage to each quadrant while we attempted to discover any 
connection to the complexity of relief operations during these disasters. We expected to 
find a significant factor separating the quadrants from one another based on the data 




IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The review of literature suggested multiple contributors to the complexity of 
HADR operations. The analysis conducted for this research strived to graphically 
represent this complexity in only two dimensions. Upon sorting our sample of disasters 
into their appropriate quadrants, we analyzed the additional defining characteristics of 
each disaster to identify any trends related to our research question. 
A. INITIAL BREAKOUT OF LOCATION AND SPEED OF ONSET (X AND 
Y DATA) 
As mentioned previously, when we initially plotted the x and y values, we noted 
two disasters that were significantly more dispersed than the others, which made the 
remaining disasters difficult to observe when graphed. After calculating z-scores for these 
two disasters, we further calculated z-scores for all of the disasters’ y values and observed 
that these two disasters were the only disasters to have z-scores higher than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean. Removing these two disasters yielded a clearer picture of the 
dispersion of the disasters, represented in Figure 7. 
Looking at our data represented in Figure 7, we see that the most frequently 
reported (and assumed occurring) disasters were tropical cyclones (25), storms (24), 
forest fires (28), general floods (44), and tornadoes (57). 
B. ADDITION OF THIRD VARIABLES 
After graphing the x and y data, we wanted to compare each of these quadrants 
incorporating a third variable. EM-DAT provided data for the number affected, number 
of casualties and total damages incurred for each of our disasters and we chose to 
incorporate each of these as a third variable. We assumed that as the value for each of 
these variables increased, so would the complexity of the disaster. This assumption 
enabled us to compare our data against the belief behind Figure 3. 
These variables are introduced graphically and displayed in Figures 8 through 13. 
The third variables are reflected in each graph as a circle, with the size being 
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proportionate to the other data points contained within the graph. The circles provide a 
good visual representation on how each disaster compares against others of similar type, 




Figure 9.  Plot of All Disasters With Number Affected 
 
Figure 10.  Plot of All Disasters with Number Affected by Quadrant (Note: Circle Size is 
Relative Only to the Disasters in Each Respective Quadrant. Comparison 
between Quadrants is Not Appropriate with This Figure.) 
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Figure 11.  Plot of All Disasters With Number of Casualties 
 
Figure 12.  Plot of All Disasters with Number of Casualties by Quadrant (Note: Circle Size 
is Relative Only to the Disasters in Each Respective Quadrant. Comparison 
between Quadrants is Not Appropriate with This Figure.) 
 33 
 
Figure 13.  Plot of All Disasters With Total Damages 
 
Figure 14.  Plot of All Disasters with Total Damages by Quadrant (Note: Circle Size is 
Relative Only to the Disasters in Each Respective Quadrant. Comparison 
between Quadrants is Not Appropriate with This Figure.) 
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C. OUTLIERS WITHIN EACH QUADRANT 
After incorporating each third variable and plotting them in graphs, we observed 
disasters that had significantly higher values for their respective third variable. For 
example, Figures 8 and 9 each contain a circle that is significantly larger than their 
surrounding counterparts. This led us to believe that there were additional outliers in our 
data. We calculated the mean and standard deviation of each third variable, which 
enabled us to eliminate disasters with a z-score greater than 3. We repeated this process 
for Quadrants I through IV for each third variable, eliminating disasters from each 
quadrant that yielded a z-score greater than 3. This process further reduced our disaster 
sample size from an initial 255 to 249 for number affected, 245 for number of casualties, 
and 238 for damage. 
Table 4.   Count of Outliers Removed in Each Quadrant Per Variable 
 
 
D. THIRD VARIABLE AVERAGES PER QUADRANT 
After calculating z-scores for each third variable in each quadrant, we found that 
the outliers significantly affected all quadrants, but most significantly Quadrants II and 
IV for the number affected variable, changing the average person affected in Quadrant II 
from 123,469 to 19,635 and from 186,522 to 2,176 for Quadrant IV. 
 
DISPERSION
QUAD I QUAD II QUAD III QUAD IV
AFFECTED 1 2 1 2
CASUALTIES 2 2 4 2
DAMAGES 3 7 5 2
NUMBER OF OUTLIERS REMOVED PER QUADRANT BY VARIABLE
Four disasters removed from sample due to broad location data
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Figure 15.  Average Number Affected by Quadrant 
 
Figure 16.  Average Number of Casualties by Quadrant 
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Figure 17.  Average Damage (in Thousands US$) by Quadrant 
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E. THIRD VARIABLE DRIVERS BY QUADRANT 
We found the percentages of each third variable by disaster type in each quadrant 
to determine which disaster types were noted as the drivers of complexity. The results are 
provided in Tables 4 through 6. 
The data shows that hurricanes drive the number affected in Quadrants I and II 
while floods, mudslides, and tornados drive Quadrants III and IV. The number of 
casualties is driven by heat waves, hurricanes, and storms in Quadrants I and II, while 
floods and tornados drive Quadrants III and IV. Finally, the total damages displayed a 
much wider spread with hurricanes and snowstorms/blizzards driving Quadrant I. 
Quadrant II is driven by storms, droughts, and hurricanes; Quadrant III by earthquakes 
and forest fires; and Quadrant IV by tornados. Overall, hurricanes and tornados were 
observed to occur the most often, and their affects tended to cause the most damage and 
affect or claim the most lives.  
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% of Total 
Damages
1 1 0.00%* 3 0.00%* 4 0.00%*
2 0 N/A**
3 2 0.27% 2 0.20%
4 2 0.00%* 2 0.00%*
5 3 0.00%* 4 0.00%* 7 0.00%*
6 1 1 0.00%*
7 8 67.11% 14 98.83% 22 76.41%
8 4 19.97% 20 0.18% 24 1.15%
9 2 0.00%* 2 0.00%*
10 2 0.00%* 8 0.02% 10 0.01%
11 5 0.00%* 7 0.00%* 12 0.00%*
12 1 1 0.00%*
13 3 7.95% 2 0.08% 5 0.46%
14 3 1 0.62% 4 0.46%
15 4 4.97% 4 0.25%
16 24 27.28% 18 54.77% 42 7.72%
17 1 0.00%* 1 0.00%*
18 3 3.16% 3 0.23%
19 1 22.62% 1 0.13% 2 3.15%
20 20 37.74% 8 2.92% 28 5.44%
21 1 1.03% 1 0.07%
22 5 0.24% 5 0.03%
23 5 1.00% 5 0.14%
24 1 0.01% 1 0.00%*
25 30 8.58% 27 37.99% 57 3.92%
26 0 N/A**
27 4 2.55% 4 0.35%
Grand Total 34 100.00% 66 100.00% 91 100.00% 58 100.00% 249 100.00%
* 0% is displayed due to total third variable value being 0 for the given disaster. 
**No disasters of this type were included when analyzing this third variable.
SUMMARY OF AFFECTED BY DISASTER TYPE, SHOWN AS PERCENT OF QUADRANT TOTAL TOTAL DAMAGES
I II III IV
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% of Total 
Damages
1 1 0.00%* 3 0.00%* 4 0.00%*
2 0 N/A**
3 1 0.00%* 1 0.00%*
4 2 2.98% 2 2.98%
5 2 1.86% 4 7.14% 6 8.99%
6 1 0.59% 1 0.59%
7 9 1.76% 15 14.76% 24 16.52%
8 4 0.73% 20 17.84% 24 18.57%
9 2 0.88% 2 0.88%
10 2 1.17% 8 7.43% 10 8.60%
11 4 0.39% 7 3.76% 11 4.15%
12 1 0.00%* 1 0.00%*
13 3 0.29% 2 0.78% 5 1.08%
14 3 0.34% 1 1.47% 4 1.81%
15 4 0.10% 4 0.10%
16 24 2.59% 20 9.53% 44 12.12%
17 1 0.00%* 1 0.00%*
18 3 2.00% 3 2.00%
19 1 0.00% 1 0.05% 2 0.05%
20 20 1.17% 8 1.08% 28 2.25%
21 1 0.10% 1 0.10%
22 6 0.68% 6 0.68%
23 4 0.34% 4 0.34%
24 0 N/A**
25 28 1.86% 25 16.18% 53 18.04%
26 0 N/A**
27 4 0.15% 4 0.15%
Grand Total 33 6.65% 66 0.576246 88 6.79% 58 28.93% 245 100.00%
* 0% is displayed due to total third variable value being 0 for the given disaster. 
**No disasters of this type were included when analyzing this third variable.
SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES BY DISASTER TYPE, SHOWN AS PERCENT OF QUADRANT TOTAL TOTAL DAMAGES
I II III IV
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% of Total 
Damages
1 1 0.00%* 3 15.33% 4 5.35%
2 0 N/A**
3 2 0.00%* 2 0.00%*
4 2 3.59% 2 1.25%
5 3 0.00%* 4 0.00%* 7 0.00%*
6 1 3.26% 1 1.14%
7 6 46.53% 9 15.20% 15 11.68%
8 4 1.82% 20 26.29% 24 9.43%
9 2 4.89% 2 1.71%
10 2 0.00%* 8 2.25% 10 0.79%
11 5 33.44% 7 14.35% 12 9.59%
12 1 0.28% 1 0.04%
13 3 6.78% 2 7.18% 5 3.43%
14 3 10.32% 1 7.66% 4 4.09%
15 4 0.83% 4 0.11%
16 23 15.94% 19 12.86% 42 6.97%
17 1 0.00%* 1 0.00%*
18 3 4.91% 3 1.94%
19 1 19.10% 1 0.05% 2 2.30%
20 19 27.19% 8 4.33% 27 4.95%
21 1 0.53% 1 0.21%
22 5 1.43% 5 0.17%
23 5 0.05% 5 0.01%
24 1 0.00%* 1 0.00%
25 28 13.84% 26 77.33% 54 32.17%
26 0 N/A**
27 4 22.45% 4 2.68%
Grand Total 32 100.00% 61 100.00% 87 100.00% 58 100.00% 238 100.00%
* 0% is displayed due to total third variable value being 0 for the given disaster. 
**No disasters of this type were included when analyzing this third variable.
TOTAL DAMAGES
I II III IV
SUMMARY OF DAMAGES BY DISASTER TYPE, SHOWN AS PERCENT OF QUADRANT TOTAL
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F. EFFECTS OF OUTLIERS 
Outliers are not always invalid data. They can simply highlight points that are 
significantly different than the rest of a sample. Several of the disasters in this sample 
appeared significantly different from most, yet they contained the most complete third 
variable data. It is important to note a few disasters that were considered outliers in this 
study. The two that stand out on the affected personnel graph above are Hurricane Ivan 
that struck the southeastern U.S. in 2004, as displayed in Quadrant II, and the flood 
affecting eight states in the Midwest over 21 days during September 2008, displayed in 
Quadrant IV. Both of these disasters produced circles on the charts in Figure 14 that 
masked numerous other disasters in their respective quadrants. 
We observed trends among our third variables when we compared them against 
our speed of onset ranking. Based on our ranking, Quadrant II carried the highest 
averages for all third variables, with Quadrant IV the second highest. We found that the 
dispersion of the affected area has a greater impact on the complexity of the disaster than 
the speed of onset. Given the numerous disasters that contained only partial third variable 
data, these trends might have displayed a more linear trend with Quadrant I yielding the 
lowest averages, Quadrants II and III being very similar, and Quadrant IV the highest 
averages, had collection efforts been complete for every disaster in our sample. There 
appears to be a lack of documentation following the completion of relief efforts either 
due to agencies moving on to the next disaster or fundraising efforts to replenish 
expended resources. This lack of data impacts research work intended to provide greater 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Categorizing disasters based solely on their affected area and speed of onset does 
not provide a complete picture on the complexity of the relief options required, although 
it does provide decision makers a soft generalization of how complex relief efforts might 
be given a possible scenario. Our sample of disasters showed that the size of the affected 
area had a greater impact on the number of disasters that were placed in the more 
complex quadrants than speed of onset of disasters. Quadrants II and IV contained those 
disasters that held the highest values of affected personnel, casualties, and dollars of 
damage.  
The analysis resulted in the belief that the number of personnel in the affected 
area, or population density of the affected area, is the greatest contributor to complexity 
of relief operations. This analysis of the U.S. revealed the biggest disaster culprits were 
tropical cyclones and tornados. The seasonality of these disasters allows areas that are 
typically affected time to prepare before they occur, much more so with hurricanes than 
tornados. Regarding hurricanes, weather technology today can provide as much as a five-
day lead time before making landfall. As seen recently with Cyclone Phailin that struck 
India, this lead time can be utilized to prepare the disaster area by evacuating personnel 
before the disaster strikes. Evacuating personnel to safer areas helps to reduce the 
complexity immediately following a disaster occurrence because fewer limited resources 
are required to rescue survivors and collect casualties.  
A method for measuring and identifying disasters based on their speed of onset is 
necessary to gain the full value of assigning disasters to specific quadrants, as shown in 
Figure 2. Although our method of assigning discreet variables provided a good visual 
representation, this method induced a biased guarantee that disasters would fall into one 
of the two quadrants on either side of the speed of onset ranking mean. Subsequent 
fallout from this method was highlighted by the averages of the third variables in each 
quadrant. 
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The lack of fidelity in measuring the affected area of the disasters in our sample 
allowed for self-induced error that may have significantly impacted the placement of 
several disasters. For smaller disasters, the affected areas tended to be more accurate 
because data provided was listed by city or county. With the larger disasters, especially in 
the category of “storms,” we feel the error in our measurement of the affected area could 
be much greater. We observed that oftentimes the database listed multiple states as 
affected, but further analysis of historical weather maps showed it was only a portion of 
one state and the entire neighboring state that was affected. Collection efforts need to be 
more accurate to benefit further analysis. It is imperative to also understand the context of 
those disasters that were identified as outliers in this analysis. Although the 
characteristics of those disasters showed they were statistically different than the rest of 
the sample, they were actual occurrences. Referencing Table 4, the majority of the 
outliers would have been positioned in Quadrants II or III, representing those that either 
impacted a significant portion of land or occurred with a higher speed of onset. Decision 
makers can prepare funding and response efforts for the “typical” results of disasters in 
each category but must be capable of supporting the larger scale disasters because they 
will strike. 
A two-dimensional graph is the most simplistic picture to help one visualize a set 
of data; but in this case, the story behind the graph may in fact provide more useful 
information. Although dispersion contributes to complexity more than the speed of onset; 
these are both uncontrollable. One key takeaway from our study is that “time” and 
“evacuations” are controllable variables that contribute the most to reducing the 
complexities of relief operations. The more people that are removed from the recovery 
portion of the immediate response phase, the less complex the operations will be. This 
allows relief agencies the time to focus on supporting the survivors and quickly begin the 
reconstruction phase. The lessons learned from past disasters are crucial to our societies’ 
survival of future ones. Further analysis of initial reports from Cyclone Phailin indicate 
that as few as 15 personnel have perished as a result of this storm. The state of Odisha 
was hit by a cyclone in 1999 where approximately 10,000 people lost their lives. A recent 
Reuters report by Gottipati and Dash (2013) stated that aid officials afforded this 
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minimization in loss of life to the population utilizing the many shelters built since 1999, 
the numerous evacuations, some of which were forced evacuations, and the five days’ 
worth of warnings issued to residents. Weather tracking and predicting technology has 
improved tremendously in the last 15 years. When utilized and responded to properly, 
“time” can help us gain a significant advantage in withstanding future natural disasters. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following ideas will facilitate enhanced analysis of historical disasters to 
identify complexity drivers for the sake of improving the global community’s preparation 
and response to future natural disasters. Developing a universal measurement for the 
speed of onset of disaster types will ensure proper disaster categorization. Accurate 
reporting of the affected area will improve the fidelity of analyzing the true impact of a 
given disaster. Detailed reporting of outcome variables by all involved agencies during 
post-mission wrap-up will significantly improve the capability of researchers to analyze 
characteristics that will ultimately define properties of each respective quadrant in Figure 
2. Consider using population density instead of using affected location because as the 
number of people to support increases, so does complexity. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research provided the foundation for determining whether a relationship 
exists between the complexity of relief operations based on the affected area and speed of 
onset of a natural disaster. Table 8 indicates further research opportunities to advance this 
study. The HADR community must commit itself to improving data collection upon the 
completion of relief efforts to aid further research and advance the capabilities of 
response forces. If further research is conducted utilizing data from CRED, we found that 
data fields within the database were not accurate, contained spelling errors, and/or were 
void of data. It was unclear if the absence of data meant that nothing occurred for that 
disaster (i.e., $0 of damage, or it meant the data was simply not collected for that 
variable). If CRED is determined to be the resident collector of HADR statistics, then 
they must apply pressure to organizations involved with the recovery to ensure data is 
submitted correctly and promptly. CRED should also establish a working relationship 
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with all major weather centers to validate and accurately define the locations affected by 
weather related disasters. If the community will take ownership of the data collection 
required to facilitate further research, the bright minds of this community can begin the 
developing methods to facilitate better planning and budgeting for future relief efforts. 
1. Use Population Density to Define Affected Area 
Utilizing the U.S. Census Bureau data, it is possible to calculate the population 
density of nearly all locations in the U.S. Since the analysis revealed an increase in the 
third variables as the affected area increased, it would be helpful to break it down further 
to determine if the population density was a greater driving force over the square mileage 
of the affected area. 
2. Expand the Date Range to Include More Disasters 
The database utilized only contained disasters in a 10 year period. Expanding the 
date range will provide a larger sample for analysis and should refine the results, 
providing more accurate expected consequences of disasters in each quadrant. This will 
be limited by the same database inefficiencies that affected this research. 
3. Expand the Research Boundaries to include Global Disasters 
Analyzing all global disasters would broaden the lens through which the disasters 
are viewed and provide a different perspective on number affected, casualties and 
damages incurred. This would require a more accurate and detailed database to obtain the 
best results. 
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